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In 1997, a new center-right government came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to 
accelerate market reforms. By the time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP 
was produced in the private sector, compared to 45 percent in 1996. The government 
however lost the elections. This paper uses unique survey data to examine whether the 
high unemployment associated with market reform contributed to the election outcome. 
High unemployment did have an effect but it was small and does not explain the election 
loss. In fact, many in the population, including the unemployed, believed that high 
unemployment was the necessary price for future prosperity.   
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In 1997, a new center-right government came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to 
accelerate market reforms. By the time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP 
was produced in the private sector, compared to 45 percent in 1996. The government 
however lost the elections. This paper uses unique survey data to examine whether the 
high unemployment associated with market reform contributed to the election outcome. 
High unemployment did have an effect but it was small and does not explain the election 
loss. In fact, many in the population, including the unemployed, believed that high 
unemployment was the necessary price for future prosperity. 
 
I.    Introduction. 
In most cases, the benefits of economic reforms in transition economies have not 
accrued instantaneously. Cutting public subsidies, privatization, and closing down 
inefficient state firms are expected to produce output and employment growth in the 
long-run but the initial effect is high unemployment. All transition economies 
experienced rapid growth in unemployment at the start of reforms, in many cases from 
zero to double digits within a few years. The unemployed generally personify the losers 
of the transition process. The literature has devoted significant attention to the political 
implications of this delay in benefits. Would the unemployed demand from political 
leaders a slowdown of reforms, more public subsidies and more protection? Would they 
vote against further reform? If so, reforms may need to be implemented gradually and 
should be sequenced so that there are clearly recognizable gains before the next step is 
taken (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). Alternatively, Rodrik (1995) argues that the 
unemployed may demand even faster reforms recognizing that the completion of reforms 
is the only long-term solution to unemployment. How the unemployed vote therefore has 
important implications for the sustainability of reforms.  
Empirical findings from developed economies suggest that unemployment and 
inflation are the “big two“ reasons (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) for loss of political 
support. Governments are penalized for negative current economic conditions. For the 
transition economies, Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) write that, “The unemployment 
crisis in the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries has contributed to a political 2 
backlash as disenchanted voters often ousted the first reform governments after a few 
years.” Yet, despite the high unemployment, reforms have generally marched forward in 
the transition economies. Warner (2001) finds that reforms in Russia have generated 
more rather than less support for further reforms. Fidrmuc (2000) also concludes that 
”instead of punishing or rewarding the government for economic performance, the 
elections in the transition countries serve as referenda on the speed of reforms, and the 
overall reform strategy.” One possible way to explain the lack of strong opposition to 
reforms is that the public views the high unemployment associated with the structural 
adjustments as a temporary and necessary cost for future economic gains in the country. 
If so, the negative impact of high unemployment on political support for reforms may be 
smaller compared to a case where high unemployment is not perceived to have any 
purpose. The literature studying voting in developed economies has generally dismissed 
the existence of such highly informed forward-looking component in voters’ behavior but 
the conditions in transition economies may be different because of the massive 
transformation. This paper uses survey data from Bulgaria to explore those ideas.  
In 1997, a new “center-right” government (the Union of Democratic Forces or 
UDF) came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to accelerate market reforms. By the 
time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP was produced in the private sector, 
compared to 45 percent in 1996. The immediate outcome of the reforms however was an 
increase in unemployment. While the economy started gaining some speed, sustained 
improvements in employment were not yet achieved by the next elections in 2001. The 
government that implemented the reforms lost the elections. On the surface, this election 
outcome looks like a backlash at the reforms spurred by the sharp increase in 
unemployment. The survey data reveal however that unemployment did not contribute to 
the growth in political opposition in significant ways. The unemployed did not become 
political opponent to the government is large numbers. What is more, in places with very 
high and persistent unemployment, the unemployed were more rather than less likely to 
support UDF. In addition, the data show that, at the height of unemployment, almost half 
of the population believed that unemployment was the necessary short-term cost of 
reforms. In fact, a significant proportion of the unemployed agents believed in that. These 
beliefs translated into additional votes for UDF.  3 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides unique 
evidence on public beliefs regarding the necessity of short-term costs in the transition 
process and their impact on the political support for reform. The results suggest that in 
addition to keeping unemployment as low as possible (something achieved in the Czech 
Republic; see Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell, 1998), sequencing reforms to build supportive 
constituency, and providing compensatory payments, it is important and possible to 
convince at least part of the public that sacrifices are necessary in order to sustain 
political support for reform. Effective communication of current policies and their impact 
is therefore essential. Such effect has not been explicitly included in theoretical models.     
Second, the paper highlights the effect of perceived permanence and 
irreversibility in reforms on the support for reform. After years of delay in tough reforms, 
by 1997 it was clear that policy reversals, which were characteristic in the early years of 
transition in Bulgaria, would lead only to deterioration of economic conditions. Rapid 
privatization and enterprise liquidation along with introducing a currency board increased 
the credibility of the government that reforms would be permanent. The experience 
therefore supports the notion that “ex ante hostility to reform and ex post support are 
quite consistent with each other.” (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991)  
Third, the paper also complements earlier research on reform and voting in 
transition economies which has used aggregate country or regional data (e.g. Fidrmuc, 
2000 and Warner, 2001) by studying voting on the individual level. For each individual, 
the survey shows which party she/he voted for in 1997 (when UDF came to power) and 
which party she/he intended to vote for after much of the reform package had been 
implemented and unemployment had increased. That makes it possible to test whether the 
employment status of individuals or/and their views on the reforms contributed to the 
rapid decline in political support for UDF. As the survey is nationally representative, it 
matches voting behavior very closely. Holding constant earlier voting behavior is 
important in transition economies to capture ideological differences in the population 
which tend to be strong.    
Finally, the survey data make it possible to differentiate the effects of 
unemployment on voting for various groups of unemployed and to test the proposition of 
Rodrik (1995) that the unemployed may demand more rather than less reforms. The 4 
results show that in rural areas where unemployment has been higher and with longer 
duration, the political support for UDF was stronger rather than weaker among the 
unemployed. The unemployed are therefore a heterogeneous group and the political 
support for reforms among them vary with differences in circumstances. In the theoretical 
literature, the unemployed are generally considered a homogenous group opposed to 
reform.  
The next section discusses in brief some major economic developments in 
Bulgaria over the last few years. The sections following that present the data and report 
empirical results. Section VII concludes with final remarks.  
 
II.  Delayed market reform in Bulgaria.  
Bulgaria has generally been one of the laggards in the transition process in 
Eastern Europe, at least until UDF accelerated reforms in 1997. According to the EBRD 
(1998), between 1992 and 1997, only 20 percent of total enterprise assets were privatized. 
In the early years of transition, loss-making enterprises were allowed to operate on soft 
budget constraints which lead to continued drain on tax money, large budget deficits, and 
deteriorating credit portfolios of commercial banks. Governments changed almost each 
year. According to Aslund (2002, p. 385) the experience of Bulgaria illustrates the danger 
of “patently inconsistent policies and erratic policy reversals” where “vested interests 
have been a far greater threat to sound economic policies in transition than disorder”. 
Bulgaria fits well the model advanced by Hellman (1998) where reforms were kept 
“partial” under the influence of vested interests who managed to extract large rents in a 
semi-market environment.
1 
The delay in reforms contributed to large budget deficits and rising public debt 
(Table 1). By 1996 much of the banking sector credits, in many cases extended under 
government directive, were non-performing. Confidence in the banking system reached 
                                                 
1 To lift some of the blame from policymakers, it should be acknowledged that to some extent the slow 
pace of reforms can be considered endogenous to Bulgaria’s initial conditions in the transition process. 
Dobrinsky (2000) argues that unlike other transition countries in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria had barely 
implemented any market reforms until the very end of communism. A large part of its trade was with the 
former Soviet Union and much of the industry operated on old technologies dependent on cheap Soviet 
energy. Reorientation of the economy required massive enterprise restructuring and liquidations, and 
therefore substantial layoffs. As the opposition spurred by the potentially negative consequences of such 
policies was strong, reforms were delayed. 5 
very low levels and deposits fled the financial system. As the exchange rate depreciated 
and prices spiraled out of control, political unrest grew and in early 1997 the then 
Socialist (BSP) government called early parliamentary elections. The elections were won 
by UDF which came to office with a mandate to accelerate structural reforms.   
According to the Bulgarian Privatization Agency, only in 1998 the government 
completed 654 privatization deals, which is almost as many as the number of deals 
completed in the prior five years from 1993 through 1997 (694 deals). Direct and implicit 
subsidies to enterprises were cut (Braxi, Shatalov, and Zlaoui, 2001), the government 
closed down 110 out of 140 unprofitable state firms, and many banks were privatized. As 
a result of the reforms, the private sector share of Bulgaria’s GDP increased from 45 
percent in 1996 to 70 percent in 2001, which put Bulgaria in line with the private sector 
shares in advanced transition economies (EBRD, 2001).   
A very important part of the reforms was the introduction of a currency board. 
The currency board not only provided a nominal anchor by fixing the domestic currency 
to the German mark and lowering inflation, but it also made it impossible for the 
government to finance budget defects by money creation.
2 That was a strong impetus to 
put public finances in order which in turn provided an incentive to the government to 
reduce subsidies and liquidate or privatize firms. In essence, maintaining a credible 
currency board required structural reform. The large political costs associated with 
abandoning the currency board implied that the cost of reversal of structural reforms was 
also high which raised the credibility of the government’s commitment to complete the 
reforms.
3  
As Table 1 shows, with the introduction of the currency board inflation declined 
very rapidly into single digits and has remained low since 1997. Stable prices, 
privatization, increased competition in financial markets, and opening the economy 
                                                 
2 A currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime with the additional provision that the central bank 
maintains foreign exchange reserves that are sufficiently large to cover the monetary base. The currency is 
fully convertible. The currency board removes discretion over monetary policy; changes in money supply 
are linked to the balance of payments with balance payments deficits leading to monetary contraction and 
balance of payments surpluses leading to monetary expansion. See Schwartz (1993) and Carlson and Valev 
(2001). 
3 Interestingly, in some cases in the framework of Dewatripont and Roland (1992), such ability to pre-
commit may be associated with more gradual rather than more rapid reform, opposite to what seems to 
have happened in Bulgaria. 6 
contributed to growing investment levels and higher growth rates (Table 1). For the first 
time since the beginning of transition Bulgaria experienced sustained positive economic 
growth. Nevertheless, the effect on employment over the initial years was small and the 
positive growth was not sufficient to compensate for the loss of jobs. By 2000 official 
unemployment had increased to 17.9 percent compared to 12.5 percent in 1996 and 
unofficial statistics suggested an even higher rate. 
Along with enterprise liquidation in 1998 UDF adopted the Unemployment 
Security and Employment Incentives Act. The Act reformed the unemployment benefits 
system reducing somewhat the generosity of benefits and strengthening incentives for 
reentry into the labor market. It also introduced a number of initiatives designed to 
facilitate job search and retraining. In general, the reform was intended to encourage the 
transition of workers between jobs rather than provide generous compensatory payments. 
That is interesting because political economy models on economic reform generally 
envision a need for compensatory payments as a way of reducing individual uncertainty 
and maintaining the political support for reforms (see Roland, 2002, for a discussion).  
 It should be pointed out that privatization and enterprise liquidation were not the 
only reasons for high unemployment. The World Bank (2001, p. 79) concludes that “the 
adverse labor market experience in Bulgaria has been linked not only to fast labor 
shedding, but also to a chronic inability to create jobs.” The inability of the private 
sectors to create jobs was in turn explained by an array of factors such as policy 
uncertainty, administrative burdens, and lack of credit. External factors also played a role. 
The war in Kosovo and the financial crisis in Russia in 1998 lead to a decline in exports. 
The international financial crises in Russia and elsewhere in the late 1990’s might also 
have depressed the inflow of foreign direct investment.  
The political movement that defeated UDF and took office in 2001 had a very 
unclear economic agenda until late in the election campaign.  It entered the political 
scene only a few months before the elections when Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha, the son 
of the last czar of Bulgaria before socialism, announced his intention to return to Bulgaria 
and run for office. The economic team was not formed until a few weeks before the 
elections. The economic plan which was rapidly put together included a mix of proposals 
for lower taxes and greater government spending and promised large inflows of foreign 7 
direct investment and rapid growth in incomes. The program promised substantial gains 
in income over a target period of 800 days. Ivan Kostov, the leader of UDF had referred 
to the program as "wild populism" (CNN, June 17
th 2001)
4.   
 
III.   Description of the survey data.  
The survey used in this paper was conducted by personal interviews by a national 
polling organization in August 2000, more than three years after the elections in April 
1997 and 10 months before the elections in June 2001. By the time of the survey, 
unemployment had reached the high levels discussed above. The sample size of 1000 
consumers, ages 16 and over, and its demographic structure are considered representative 
of the population of 8 million. The analysis in the next sections excludes agents who were 
not yet 18 in 1997 as eighteen is the voting age in Bulgaria. The survey asked 
respondents which party they voted for in the 1997 elections and which party they would 
vote for if elections were held today. The survey also inquired about respondents’ views 
on the reform process by asking them whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or 
strongly disagreed with the following statement:  
 
High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity.   
 
The survey asked about respondents’ employment status and included questions 
on demographic characteristics – age, education, gender, income, and place of residence. 
In the survey, 28.95 percent of the individuals in the labor force (the unemployed plus the 
employed) reported that they were unemployed. The unemployment rate reported in the 
survey is higher than the official and reflects the view that official unemployment does 
not capture the magnitude of the problem.
5  
To determine how closely the survey responses match the actual election 
outcomes, election results were obtained from a database compiled by the Department of 
Government at the University of Essex with the help of The International Foundation for 
                                                 
4 Available at www.cnn.com.  
5 Blanchard (1997) discusses the mismatch between official and actual unemployment in transition 
economies. His preferred measure is the unemployment rate compiled from surveys as the one studied here.  8 
Electoral Systems and the Association of Central and East European Election Officials. 
The database provides detailed historic information on voting in transition economies.  
Before discussing the distribution of votes, it should be pointed out that voter 
turnout (the percent of eligible voters who did vote) reported in the survey is somewhat 
different from the actual turnout. In the survey, 78 percent of respondents reported that 
they cast a vote in 1997. In the actual elections, that number was 55 percent. Apparently, 
either the survey over-sampled voters or many agents claimed that they voted without 
having done so. The survey predicted a 56 percent turnout in the 2001 elections, while 
the actual turnout was higher, 67 percent. That is easier to explain, since the party that 
won the elections was not yet formed in August 2000. As elections approached, more 
agents might have decided to vote for them rather than not vote.  
With this in mind, consider Table 2 which shows the actual and survey 
distributions of votes. The actual percent of votes for UDF in 1997 (49.15 percent) was 
very close to that reported in the survey (51.94 percent). The survey overestimates 
somewhat the percent of votes for the socialist party BSP which was in office until 1997: 
31.73 percent in the survey as opposed to 22.40 percent in the actual elections. The 
remaining numbers on the 1997 elections from the survey and the actual elections are 
close to each other. In the 2001 elections, the percent of votes for UDF, BSP, and MRF
6 
predicted by the survey were also close to the actual outcomes. The big addition in 2001 
was Coalition Simeon. In general, the survey does a reasonably good job matching the 
actual results. Most importantly, it reflects the withdrawal of political support for UDF 
between the two elections which is the focus of this paper.    
Using the survey data, we can determine whether the withdrawal of political 
support from UDF was influenced by the employment status of an individual and his or 
her views on the reform. Before we examine the effect on voting, however, the next 
section discusses the public views on reform. Did Bulgarians believe in the tradeoff 
between short-term costs and long-term gains?   
 
                                                 
6 The Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) is generally associated with the Turkish ethnic minority in 
Bulgaria. The other two smaller parties that received votes above the 4 percent threshold to enter 
Parliament were the Bulgarian Business Bloc and Evrolevica. Neither of these parties is distinctly pro or 
anti-reform compared to UDF.   9 
IV.  Views on the necessity of the cost of market reform. 
Table 3 shows the distributions of answers regarding the statement on economic 
reform. The data reveal that 38.86 percent of the population believed (more or less 
strongly) that high unemployment was the price for future prosperity. The percent is 
smaller compared to the percent who disagreed with the claim (48.02 percent). The 
remaining 13.13 percent did not provide an answer. It is difficult to judge whether 38.86 
percent is a large number because similar data are not available from other countries. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that a large part of the population perceived a purpose for 
the high unemployment despite the very high unemployment. Table 3 also reports the 
beliefs regarding that statement separately for the unemployed and the employed 
respondents. Notice that the beliefs among the unemployed are not very different from 
the beliefs in the population at large. Thirty five percent (34.60) of the unemployed 
believed that current unemployment was the price for future prosperity. In fact, it is 
remarkable that 16.22 percent strongly believed that claim.  
These results suggest that the growth in political opposition to reform produced 
by personal experiences at the micro level (unemployment) may be ameliorated to some 
extent by an understanding of how that personal experience fits in the macro-level 
dynamics of the economy. In that sense, from a policy perspective, to sustain reform it is 
important how effectively the government communicates that a period of high 
unemployment is unavoidable as much as how successful it is in trying to minimize the 
level of unemployment. The data from Bulgaria show that the message of short-term 
costs for the purpose of long-term gains is likely to get through to the public even when 
personal experiences at the individual level are negative.  
To explore how the views regarding the statement differ across various segments 
of the population, Table 4 reports the estimates of a probit equation where the likelihood 
that an agent agrees or strongly agrees with the necessity of high unemployment is 
explained by their employment status and several demographic characteristics: education, 
age, gender, income, and place of residency. Views on the cost of reforms may differ 
across agents because of better information (e.g. more versus less education) or because 
of different personal experiences.  10 
Agents with more education were more likely to state that unemployment was a 
necessary short-term cost. This result may reflect a better understanding by the more 
educated about the tradeoffs between the short-term and the long-term involved in the 
process of market reform. The result may also be explained by the generally easier 
market experience of more educated agents during transition. The World Bank (2001) 
reports that the unemployment rate for individuals with higher education was around 5 
percent throughout the 1990’s which is more than two times lower than the 
unemployment rate for the population at large. These agents have found it easier to retool 
and transition between sectors of the economy. Other authors (e.g. Werner, 2001, and 
Fidrmuc, 2000) have also found evidence for greater support for reform among more 
educated agents in transition economies.  
Older agents were less likely to share the view that unemployment was a 
necessary cost of reforms. Although older individuals have had a lower unemployment 
rate compared to the population at large (10.1 percent for people ages 50-64 compared to 
31.4 percent for agents ages 15-24 in 1999, World Bank 2001), for many employment 
was tied to state firms. As those were restructured, privatized or liquidated during the 
rapid reforms after 1997, older agents may have experienced increased employment 
uncertainty. In addition, older agents may be less accustomed to the phenomenon of 
unemployment as they have spent a larger portion of their lives under socialism when 
unemployment was close to zero.  
 
V.  Employment status, beliefs about market reforms, and support for UDF. 
Table 5 reports a cross-tabulation of votes in the 1997 parliamentary elections 
reported in the survey and the expected distribution of votes in the 2001 elections. 
Respondents were placed in three categories: those that voted for UDF, those who voted 
for another party and those who did not vote. The cross-tabulation shows a large 
withdrawal of votes from UDF. Only 41.8 percent of agents who voted for UDF in 1997 
intended to vote for them again. There was a shift in votes towards other parties (17.9 
percent) as well as a decision by many agents who voted for UDF in 1997 to not vote at 
all (40.3 percent). Very few agents (six in total) who had not voted for UDF in 1997 now 
intended to do so. Within three years, the political support for UDF had diminished 11 
substantially. This section explores whether the decline in political support can be 
explained by the rise in unemployment.  
We begin by looking at some summary statistics. Table 6 reports the percent of 
respondents who intended to vote for UDF in 2001. The sample is split according to the 
employment status of respondents as well as their views on the two statements discussed 
above. The purpose of these divisions in the sample is to show whether unemployed 
individuals and those that disagreed with the statement were less likely to vote for UDF. 
Consider the first column of results which reports the distribution of votes using the 
whole sample of agents. Among the unemployed, 11.96 percent intended to vote for UDF 
compared to 18.70 percent in the group of employed individuals. The difference of 6.74 
percentage points is statistically significant. Only 12.42 percent of the respondents who 
did not believe that high unemployment was the price of future prosperity intended to 
vote for UDF compared with 22.18 percent for the rest. The difference of 9.76 percentage 
points is statistically significant.   
The second column of results shows the same distribution of votes but only in the 
group of individuals who voted for UDF in 1997. Here, the percentages reflect the 
probability that agents who voted for UDF in 1997 would vote again for UDF in 2001. 
Unemployed individuals and those that did not believe that unemployment was a 
necessary cost of reforms were less likely to repeat their vote for UDF. There is a 20.60 
percentage points difference in the likelihood of voting again for UDF between employed 
and unemployed individuals.  
Next, we explore whether these relationships hold in a multivariate context by 
estimating a probit equation where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a respondent 
intended to vote for UDF and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are as follows. The 
model includes a dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent is unemployed, zero 
otherwise and a dummy variable that equals 1 if she agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement on economic reform. The model controls for voting in 1997. It includes a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual voted for UDF in 1997, zero otherwise. 
Also included are agents’ level of education, gender, age, income, and place of residency 
(rural or urban). The results are reported in Table 7.  12 
Table 7 reports the marginal effects so that the coefficients can be interpreted as a 
direct influence on the probability of voting for UDF evaluated at the mean of the 
respective independent variable. In the case of dummy variables used as independent 
variables, the reported coefficient estimate equals the probability of voting for UDF if 
that dummy variable is one minus the probability of voting for UDF if it is zero. For 
example, the coefficient 0.389 on voting for UDF in 1997 means that, controlling for 
other effects, the probability of voting for UDF in 2001 was 38.9 percentage points 
higher for an agent who voted for UDF in 1997 compared to an agent who did not vote 
for UDF in 1997.   
The first two columns in Table 7 report estimates using the whole sample. 
Similarly to the results in Table 6, unemployed individuals and those that did not 
consider unemployment to be a necessary cost of reforms were less likely to vote for 
UDF. This result holds after controlling for their voting in 1997 and for demographics. 
The sizes of the coefficients however are very small. For example, the likelihood that an 
unemployed person votes for UDF is only 3.3 percentage points lower compared to the 
likelihood for the rest of the population (model 1).    
Columns 3 and 4 report estimates using only the sample of agents who voted for 
UDF in 1997. Here, the likelihood that an unemployed individual voted again for UDF is 
18.2 percentage points lower compared to an employed individual. Although the 
coefficient on unemployment is larger compared to the results in the first two columns, 
the effect is still small. The effect of unemployment can be interpreted as follows. Out of 
five individuals who voted for UDF in 1997 and are now unemployed, about four would 
still vote for UDF and one would not. In terms of a number of votes, that translated into 
15 unemployed individuals in the survey who had voted for UDF in 1997 and were not 
voting for them in 2001. That is only 4 percent of the electorate of UDF in 1997, a 
relatively small fraction of the percent of votes they lost. 
Those who believed in the necessity of unemployment had a 17.7 percentage 
points higher likelihood of repeating their vote for UDF. How does that effect translate 
into votes? Among the individuals who voted for UDF in 1997 (385 altogether), 187 
believed or strongly believed that unemployment was a necessary cost of reforms. That, 
combined with the 0.177 coefficient estimate, implies that UDF received 33 votes 13 
(187*0.177) more compared to an alternative case in which no one in the population 
believed that unemployment was necessary. The interesting result is that these votes were 
more compared to the votes lost because of unemployment (15 votes). In essence, what 
UDF lost in terms of votes because of individuals’ personal experience with 
unemployment was more than offset by convincing part of the population that 
unemployment was necessary.
7   
  The results show two additional interesting effects. Individuals with more 
education were more likely to vote for UDF. As pointed out earlier, these agents had less 
dramatic experience in terms of unemployment during the reforms. Not only was 
unemployment among the university graduates lowest throughout the transition but it also 
declined between 1998 and 1999, the years of most intense reforms. These agents were 
therefore willing to support current policies. Table 7 also shows that female agents were 
less likely to support UDF. That may also be related to labor market experiences during 
transition. According to the World Bank (2001, p. 80) one of the features of the rapid 
decline in employment rates in Bulgaria has been the massive “dis-employment of 
women.”  
 
VI.  A differential effect of unemployment on voting. 
  The results reported in the previous section suggest that, although the size of the 
effect is not large, personal experiences with unemployment in Bulgaria contributed to 
the growth in political opposition. The evidence therefore does not lend support to the 
idea advanced by Rodrik (1995) that the unemployed perceive the completion of market 
reforms as the only long-term solution to their problem and would therefore vote for 
more rather than less reform. That however may not be the complete story. The 
experience with unemployment has not been the same across social groups and regions in 
the country. Unemployment for example has been much higher in rural areas compared to 
cities. In many of those localities, a single larger employer had been liquidated during the 
transition process and the percent long-term unemployed is higher compared to cities 
                                                 
7 This conclusion assumes that some agents had decided to discontinue their support for UDF because of 
painful reform outcomes even though they may not be unemployed themselves. With a high rate of 
unemployment, many agents were indirectly affected through the experience of relatives. Also, with the 
rise in unemployment, the employed may have perceived greater job uncertainty.    14 
where unemployment has been lower. For the country overall the long-term unemployed, 
i.e. agents who are unemployed for at least 12 months, are approximately 50 percent of 
the unemployed which is higher than in many other transition economies (see Boeri and 
Terrell 2002). Is it possible that, as Rodrik (1995) suggests, unemployment would 
increase rather than decrease the support for reform in localities where the labor market 
has been stagnant? For these workers, after years of failed incomplete reforms, the 
solution may be associated with growth in private sector employment as opposed to 
continued state intervention.  
Another interesting variable is age. Unemployment among older workers has been 
lower compared to younger workers as many of them have maintained employment in 
state firms that still operated or were privatized rather than liquidated. Younger 
individuals have experienced higher unemployment even though they may be better 
suited (through more recent education, for example) to find employment in the newly 
expanding sectors of the economy such as the technology sector or services. The high 
unemployment among young individuals reflects the inability of the private sector to 
create jobs. For those individuals, as for the unemployed in more rural areas, the solution 
may be more rather than less market reform. To explore those ideas, we interact the 
dummy variable for unemployment with place of residency and age and include the 
interaction terms in the probit equation which explains voting in 2001. The equations 
were estimated only with the sample of voters who voted for UDF in 1997 to examine 
directly the reasons for loss of support for UDF. These estimations produced stronger 
results compared to equations using the full sample. 
The first column of results reported in Table 8 show that while the coefficient on 
unemployment is negative and significant as in Table 7, the interaction variable of 
unemployment and rural residence is positive and statistically significant. In addition, the 
size of the coefficient on the interaction variable is greater than the coefficient on 
unemployment and the difference is statistically significant. These results suggest that 
unemployment in rural areas actually contributed to stronger support for UDF while in 
urban areas it contributed to political opposition, which lends some support to Rodrik 
(1995). The interaction variable with age did not produce statistically significant results.   
 15 
VII. Final  remarks. 
This paper examines the loss of political support for a “reformist” party in the 
2001 elections in Bulgaria. At those elections, the party that had come to power four 
years ago and implemented market reforms was defeated. The paper uses data from a 
national consumer survey to examine whether the election defeat can be explained by the 
increase in unemployment produced by the reforms. The data show that despite the very 
high level of unemployment, many agents (including the unemployed) believed that high 
unemployment was a necessary short-term cost of the reforms. High unemployment was 
not sufficient to explain the loss of political support for the party implementing the 
reforms.  
Although the election campaign of the new government in 2001 featured a variety 
of tax and spending initiatives that may be considered populist, they generally continued 
the same path of reform. The advancing negotiations for European Union membership 
and the strong presence of the International Monetary Fund in Bulgaria contributed to 
softening most of those initiatives. In that sense, the Bulgarian experience fits well with 
observations from other transition economies where reformist parties have been voted out 
of office but the reforms themselves were not reversed (Hellman, 1998). While that can 
be attributed to some external pressure to continue reforms, the evidence presented here 
shows that the internal resistance to reform was not strong. The unemployed who are 
generally considered the losers of market reforms did not become political opponents of 
the reformist party. The election loss of the reformist party cannot be interpreted as a vote 
against reform.  
A potential reason for that outcome is the high degree of irreversibility in reforms 
produced by their rapid implementation and the introduction of the currency board. While 
it may make sense for state workers to oppose proposed liquidation of inefficient state 
firms while the firms still operate, it does not make much sense to oppose further reform 
once inefficient firms have been closed for good. At that point, the solution requires 
further reform rather than stalling reforms. In that sense, the results highlight the 
difference between opposition to the initiation of reforms (ex-ante opposition) and 
opposition to sustaining the reform (ex-post opposition). The results suggest that 16 
opposition from the short-term losers may not be too strong once reforms have been 
initiated in a credible way. 
Why did UDF lose the elections then? Ivan Kostov, the leader of UDF explained 
the 2001 election defeat in the following way: “We have taken a lot of unpopular 
decisions and also made mistakes.” (CNN, June 17
th 2001). The “mistakes” to which Mr. 
Kostov refers to are most likely his government’s inefficiency in fighting corruption and 
high crime. Many privatization deals were not transparent and in many cases the media 
argued that privatization deals were not done in the public’s interest. It is also possible 
that voters had unreasonably high expectations in 1997 of what can be accomplished in 
terms of growth and employment in a few years. Krassen Stanchev, director of the 
Institute for Market Economics in Bulgaria pointed out that if “the often dour Mr. Kostov 
has a weakness, it is his failure to communicate his successes to Bulgarians.”
8 On that 
last point, however, the survey data show that many agents in Bulgaria were receptive to 
the message of short-term sacrifices for long-term benefits advanced by UDF.  
The new government promised substantial improvements in living standard 
within a target of 800 days. Judging from the economic performance halfway to that 
target, that may have been too optimistic. A follow-up survey in June 2002, one year after 
the 2001 elections, revealed that only 9.65 percent of Bulgarians intended to vote for the 
new government if elections were held on that day, down from 42.74 percent in the actual 
elections in 2001. Just like with UDF, the government had lost support very rapidly. Does 
that mean that Bulgarians oppose market reform? Probably not. More likely, they feel 
that reforms should be done better and that six years is too long for what was supposed to 
be a short-term period of high transition costs.      
 
                                                 
8 The New York Times, June 17, 2001. 17 
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Table 1 
Macroeconomic developments, Bulgaria 1992 – 2001. 
 
Year CPI  inflation 
(percentage 
change in the 
CPI) 
Budget 
balance 
(percent of 
GDP,  
- deficit) 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation  
(percent of 
GDP) 
Real GDP 
growth 
(percentage 
change) 
Unemploy 
ment rate 
1992 79.2  -2.9   -7.3 15.3 
1993 63.9  -8.7   -1.5 16.4 
1994 121.9  -3.9 9.3  1.8 12.8 
1995 32.9  -5.7  14.6  2.1 11.1 
1996 310.8  -10.4 8.9  -10.1 12.5 
1997 578.6  -2.1  12.2  -7.0 13.7 
1998 1.0  0.9  11.6  3.5 12.2 
1999 6.2  -0.9  15.9  2.4 16.0 
2000 11.4  -1.1  16.3  5.8 17.9 
2001 10.4  -1.5  19.9  4.6 17.3 
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report, various years; Bulgarian 
National Bank, Annual Report, various years. 
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Table 2 
Matching survey responses and actual voting outcomes  
in the 1997 and 2001 elections. 
Percent of votes for various political parties. 
 
1997 elections  2001 elections   
 
Actual election 
results 
Survey  
results  
Actual election 
results 
Survey  
results  
Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF)  49.15 51.94  18.18  19.25 
Socialist Party (BSP)  22.40  31.73  17.53  20.75 
Evrolevica 5.57  3.08  -  - 
Bulgarian Business Bloc  5.27  1.20  -  - 
Movement for Rights 
and Freedom  9.44 7.10  7.45  4.17 
Coalition Simeon   -  -  42.74  - 
Notes: UDF was in office from 1997 to 2001. Included are only political parties that received votes in 
excess of the 4 percent threshold needed to enter Parliament. Coalition Simeon did not exist in 1997 and at 
the time of the survey.  
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Table 3  
Is high unemployment a necessary cost of market reform? 
Survey results from Bulgaria, August 2000. 
 
Statement:  
High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity. 
 
All respondents  Unemployed  Employed 
Strongly agree  17.71  16.22  17.98 
Agree 21.15  18.38  21.86 
Disagree 23.33 20.54  23.93 
Strongly disagree  24.69  24.32  24.84 
Uncertain 13.13  20.54  11.38 
Notes: All numbers are in percent of total. 22 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Beliefs about the cost of market reforms in Bulgaria.  
Survey results, August 2000. Probit analysis.  
 
 
Dependent variable: 1 if an individual agreed or strongly 
agreed with the following Statement: 
High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future 
prosperity. 
Unemployed  -0.036 
(0.046) 
Education  0.156*** 
(0.039) 
Female  -0.042 
(0.032) 
Age  -0.002* 
(0.001) 
Income  0.027 
(0.017) 
Rural  0.014 
(0.035) 
Pseudo R
2  
Number of observations 
     0.029 
                                               946 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1, (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 5 
Cross tabulation of votes in 1997 and expected voting in 2001.  
Survey results from Bulgaria, August 2000. 
 
Individuals who planned to: 
  In 1997, 
individuals who:  
Vote for UDF  Not vote  Vote for another 
party  Totals 
Voted for UDF  161 
(41.8) 
155 
(40.3) 
69 
(17.9) 
385 
(100) 
Did not vote  3 
(1.4) 
185 
(86.9) 
25 
(11.7) 
213 
(100) 
Voted for another 
party 
3 
(0.8) 
93 
(25.6) 
266 
(73.4) 
362 
(100) 
Totals  167 
(17.4) 
433 
(45.1) 
360 
(37.5) 
960 
(100) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
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Table 6 
Employment status, beliefs about market reform, and voting behavior. 
Survey results from Bulgaria, August 2000. 
 
Percent of individuals who intended to vote for UDF   
Overall survey sample  Sample of individuals who 
voted for UDF in 1997 
Employed   
Unemployed  
Difference  
18.70 
11.96 
6.74** 
45.93 
25.33 
20.60*** 
Agree with Statement on reform  
Disagree with Statement on reform 
Difference 
22.18 
12.42 
9.76*** 
46.73 
35.06 
11.67** 
Notes: ***(**) significant at the 1(5) percent level.  
Statement: High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity. 
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Table 7 
Employment status, beliefs about market reform, and voting behavior. 
Survey results from Bulgaria, August 2000. Probit analysis. 
 
Dependent variable:  
1 if an individual intended to vote for UDF, 0 otherwise. 
Overall survey sample  Sample of individuals who voted for 
UDF in 1997 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Voted for UDF 
in 1997 
0.389*** 
(0.026) 
0.379*** 
(0.027)    
Unemployed  -0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.182*** 
(0.059) 
-0.136* 
(0.071) 
Agree with State- 
ment on reform 
0.063*** 
(0.019) 
0.054*** 
(0.018) 
0.177*** 
(0.050) 
0.155** 
(0.052) 
Education   0.045** 
(0.017)    0.189** 
(0.069) 
Female   -0.031* 
(0.016)    -0.097* 
(0.052) 
Age   0.001 
(0.001)    0.003 
(0.002) 
Income  0.005 
(0.007)    0.028 
(0.026) 
Rural   0.007 
(0.017)    0.020 
(0.058) 
Pseudo R
2 
Observations 
 
0.356 
         952 
0.366 
          940 
0.044 
          382 
0.06 
           380 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1, (5, 10) percent level. 
Statement: High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity. 
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Table 8  
Employment status and voting behavior.  
Differentiating between individuals in rural and urban areas and in terms of age.  
Survey results from Bulgaria, August 2000. Probit analysis. 
 
  Dependent variable:  
1 if an individual intended to vote for UDF, 0 otherwise. 
Unemployed  -0.340*** 
(0.071) 
-0.407** 
(0.143) 
Unemployed * Rural  0.521*** 
(0.087)   
Unemployed * Age    0.009 
(0.006) 
Agree with Statement on 
reform 
0.167*** 
(0.052) 
0.153 
(0.052) 
Education  0.182** 
(0.070) 
0.177** 
(0.070) 
Female  -0.098* 
(0.053) 
-0.092* 
(0.053) 
Age  0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Income  0.023 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
Rural  -0.095 
(0.063) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
Pseudo R
2 
Number of observations  
0.101 
                    380 
                   0.074 
                    380 
Notes: Sample of agents who voted for UDF in 1997. Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant 
at the 1, (5, 10) percent level.  
Statement: High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity. 
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